Observations and Options for Consideration:

- The facility is a mixed tenant building with varying levels of security posture. Due to the presence of the Credit Union and Cafeteria the overall security rating for the facility is currently LOW. Ease of access from the adjacent college greatly reduces the overall access control measures in place in the first floor lobby.
    - Remove non law enforcement related activities to another location off-site.
    - Moving non law enforcement tenants to the first floor outside the security envelope will dramatically raise the overall security rating of the facility.
    - Creating another layer of security segregating traffic from the credit union and cafeteria.
        - Placing security checkpoints past these public access venues would greatly increase overall security. However this solution would increase man-hour and equipment overhead for day to day operations.
    - Consider creating a facility wide working group to address security concerns and collaborate on mitigation. This will also allow for a fuller spectrum security posture by placing all tenants on a common operating level.

- The current screening area for the main entryway is within the building envelope. This allows for malicious persons to enter the facility unscreened and unchallenged. Detonation of a backpack sized explosive device would cause catastrophic blast damage to the facilities structure.
    - Consider moving visitor screening out of the current building footprint. The landing on the stairs leading into the building could be used as a initial screening area for magnetometers and bag search while not impeding general business or access to the facility.
    - During the planning phase of the first floor renovation, consider hardening walls and windows of the main lobby to funnel blasts to the outside of the building.

- The walkway from the adjacent school allows for individuals to gain unauthorized access to secure areas.
    - Consider utilizing chain link fencing to reduce the likelihood of malicious persons gaining unviewed/unauthorized access to the facility.

- The public facing employees do not have duress alarms.
    - Provide additional communications equipment to the front desk personnel, such as cell phones, duress alarms, and/or panic buttons. Source

- Exterior lighting appears to be inadequate by current security standards
    - Security protection can be successfully addressed through adequate lighting. The type and design of lighting, including illumination levels, is critical. Illuminating Engineering

Society of North America (IESNA) guidelines can be used. The site lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system.
    - Reference: GSA PBS-P100
  - Installing two or more lighting units at pedestrian entrances that provide adequate illumination for recognizing individuals and examining credentials. Source
  - Update the lighting system to ensure illumination uniformity, so that security personnel can see ahead and to the sides with an absence of dark areas caused by shadows. Lighting should be brightest in secure areas, with the light gradually less in areas adjacent to high-illumination areas. Source

- The facility does not utilize Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) practice to enhance security
  - The focus of CPTED is on creating defensible space by employing:

    1. Natural access controls:
    - Design streets, sidewalks, and building entrances to clearly indicate public routes and direct people away from private/restricted areas
    - Discourage access to private areas with structural elements and limit access (no cut-through streets)
    - Loading zones should be separate from public parking

    2. Natural surveillance:
    - Design that maximizes visibility of people, parking areas, and building entrances; doors and windows that look out on to streets and parking areas
    - Shrubbery under 2 feet in height for visibility
    - Lower branches of existing trees kept at least 10 feet off the ground
    - Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks and streets to control pedestrian and vehicle circulation
    - Adequate nighttime lighting, especially at exterior doorways

    3. Territorial reinforcement:
    - Design that defines property lines
    - Design that distinguishes private/restricted spaces from public spaces using separation, landscape plantings; pavement designs (pathway and roadway placement); gateway treatments at lobbies, corridors, and door placement; walls, barriers, signage, lighting, and CPTED fences
    - Traffic-calming devices for vehicle speed control

    4. Target hardening:
    - Prohibit entry or access: window locks, deadbolts for doors, interior door hinges
    - Access control (building and employee/visitor parking) and intrusion detection systems

    5. Closed circuit television cameras:

- Prevent crime and influence positive behavior, while enhancing the intended uses of space. In other words, design that eliminates or reduces criminal behavior and at the same time encourages people to keep an eye out for each other. References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

- Employees are not trained on suspicious behavior identification and response
    - Provide suspicious activity awareness training to civilian facility employees, including topics related to uncontrolled parking areas. Provide options (e.g., hotline, direct phone or radio communications with security operations) for employees to report suspicious activity, potential threats, and incidents.

- The access control measures for the rear parking lot are not sufficient to stop a vehicle ramming attack. Currently neither the guard shack or guard arm are vehicle rated structures. This creates a weak point in the perimeter.
    - Parking lot security are poorly trained and do not have post orders. At the time of the assessment the attendant in the access booth was unable to answer rudimentary security questions on processes, procedures, and emergency response.

- There are trash receptacles in close proximity to the building which could be used to hide explosive devices.
    - Ensure areas near entrances are clear of objects which could conceal explosive devices.

- The facility lacks a documented security force surge plan.
    - Establish a surge capacity plan to augment the security force during special circumstances, for example, during special events or natural disasters, and elevated threat situations. Options may include law enforcement officers (MOA, contract, and/or off-duty) or contract security (as part of an existing contract and/or another contract). Detail in the surge capacity plan the roles, responsibilities, and chain of command for both regular and surge forces. Source

- Critical areas have varying levels of CCTV coverage
    - Consider reviewing CCTV coverage on building blueprints to identify high risk areas lacking coverage.

- Currently there is no requirement for patron/employee security reporting

- Establish a system for reporting security concerns. Include mechanisms for the documentation, investigation, and review of related incidents and actions taken. Source

- Provide one or more options (e.g., hotline, direct phone or radio communications with security operations) for personnel to report security concerns (e.g., suspicious activity, potential threat, and incidents).

- The facility lacks a documented security plan.

  - Develop a comprehensive security plan specific to the facility. The plan should address topics such as the following: physical security measures and systems, security force, access control procedures, information protection, and security awareness training. In addition, the plan should include elements such as the following: an assessment of possible security risks; a review of threats to the facility and the facility's vulnerabilities; an up-to-date point of contact roster for key personnel responsible for security and first responders; and identification of critical assets or areas. Train personnel on the plan, and exercise the plan at least once a year.

  - Designate an employee to act as a security manager and task that person with developing, implementing, and coordinating all security-related activities. If possible, choose an employee with previous security experience. Consult *The Critical Success Factor Method: Establishing a Foundation for Enterprise Security Management*, available at http://www.ready.gov/document/critical-success-factor-method-establishing-foundation-enterprise-security-management-0, for more information. Source

  - Consult *The Critical Success Factor Method: Establishing a Foundation for Enterprise Security Management*, available at http://www.ready.gov/document/critical-success-factor-method-establishing-foundation-enterprise-security-management-0, for more information. Source

  - The facility does not exercise its emergency operation / emergency action plan annually.

    - Conduct regular drills and exercises to validate the emergency operation/emergency action plan and to evaluate the ability of personnel to carry out their assigned roles and responsibilities. For more information, visit the Ready.gov Website at http://www.ready.gov/business/testing/exercises. Source 1, Source 2

- Ground-floor windows do not have protective measures to mitigate the hazardous effects of flying glass during an explosive event.

  - Conduct an assessment to determine additional appropriate, feasible mitigation measures to reduce the vulnerability and risk associated with flying glass during an explosive event.

Options to consider include, but are not limited to, anti-shatter film, blast curtains, bullet-resistant glass, and laminated glass. Source

For comments, concerns or additional questions feel free to contact us at the following.

Gary Warren
Protective Security Advisor – South Florida
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection
10350 NW 112th Avenue, Miami, FL 33178
Office: 305 863 5253
Cellular: 954 290 8304
Email: gary.warren@dhs.gov

Matthew Frost
Protective Security Advisor – South Florida
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
National Protection and Programs Directorate
Office of Infrastructure Protection
10350 NW 112th Avenue, Miami, FL 33178
Mobile: (305)-389-8547
Email: matthew.frost@hq.dhs.gov